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YSR పార్టిలో జగన్ గారి తర్వాత స్తానం వారి అమ్మ గారైన విజయలక్ష్మి గారో లేక సోదరి షర్మిల గారో ఆక్రమిస్తారు అని అందరూ అనుకున్నారు. జగన్ గారు కూడా ఇదివరలో తను జైలులో ఉన్న సమయాల్లో కూడా , తన పార్టిలో అనుభవజ్ఞులు అయిన నాయకులు ఉన్నప్పటికి , పార్టి బాద్యతలు తన తల్లి , చెల్లికే అప్ప చెప్ప్పారు. కాని వారివురు పార్టిని జగన్ గారంతా సమర్దంగా నడపలెరేమో అనిపిస్తుంది. ఆయనకు అంతో ఇంతో అధికార పక్షాన్ని ఎదుర్కొనడం లో సహకరిస్తుంది ఎవరంటే హావబావ జబర్దస్త్ నటిమణి శ్రీమతి రోజాగారే అని చెప్పవచ్చు .
అసెంబ్లీలో అయితే అధికార పక్షాన్ని ఇరుకున ఇరుకున పెట్టడానికి జగన్ గారు తన శక్తి వంచన లేకుండా ప్రయత్నం చేస్తున్నప్పట్కి , కాకలు తీరిన అధికార పక్ష యోదుల వ్యూహాలు ముందు నిలువలేక పోతున్నారు.
మొన్నటికి మొన్న తన పార్టిలో నుండి అధికార పార్తీలోకి జంప్ చేసిన వారి పని పడదామని ప్రయోగించిన ప్రభుత్వం మీద అవిశ్వాసం డివిజన్ కోరక ముందే వీగి పోయింది. కాబట్టి ఎవరు అనుకూలమో , ఎవరు వ్యతిరేకమో తెలిసే అవకాశమే లేదు. ఇక ఆ తెల్లారే ప్రవేశ పెట్టిన "స్పీకర్ పై అవిశ్వాస తీర్మానం ని అనుహ్యంగా వెంటనే చేపట్టి రెండు గంటల్లోనే దాన్ని తుస్సుమనిపించడం లో సఫలీక్రుతులాయ్యరు అధికార పక్షం వారు. మరి జగన్ గారి పార్టి విప్ జారీ చేసిందో లేదో తెలియదు. తనకు విప్ జారి చేసే సమయం కూడా ఇవ్వటం లేదని జగన్ గారు మీడియా ముందు వాపోతున్నారు అంటే ఇవ్వలేదనుకుంటా. అంతే కాక జగన్ తన తొందరపాటు తనం తో అధికార పక్షానికి తరచుగా దొరికిపోతూ అభాసుపాలవుతున్నారు. దీనితో జగన్ పార్టి నుండి వెళ్లి పోదాం అనుకునే వారు తమ జంప్ లను కన్ ఫర్మ్ చేసుకుంటున్నట్లు ఉంది.
తెలుగు దేశం అస్దికార పక్షాన్ని ఇరుకున పెట్టడం లో జగన్ గారి స్త్రేటజీ విపలమైనట్టికి , అనుకోకుండా అంతకు ముందు సెషన్స్ లో అసెంబ్లీ లో అధికార పక్షం చేసిన "రోజా ఏక్ సాల్ బహిష్కరణ " తీర్మానం విషయం లో మాత్రం జగన్ గారి పార్టి , అధికార పక్షాన్ని ఇరుకున పెట్టినట్లే కనపడుతుంది. రోజా గారి కేసును పర్సీలించిన సుప్రీం కోర్టు వారు " ఈ దేశం లో బయట ఏమి జరుగుతుందో అస్సలు అర్దం కావడం లేదు " అని వ్యాక్యానించారు అంటె " రోజా బహిష్కరణ అంశం లో అధికార పక్షం యొక్క అత్యుత్సాహం తో కూడిన నియమ ఉల్లంఘనను గ్రహించారు అని అర్దం అర్దమవుతుంది. అందుకే హై కోర్టు వారు కూడా అంద్రా అసెంబ్లీ లెజిస్లేత్చర్ వ్యవహారాల మంత్రి గారి మోషన్ మరియు స్పీకర్ గారి నిర్ణయాధికారాన్ని ప్రస్నించకుండా , కేవలం చట్టం లో నిర్దేసించిన నియమం లోని అంశాలు గమనించకుండా ఒక సెషన్ కాలం కి బదులు సంవత్సరం పాటు ఒక సబ్యురాలిని అసెంబ్లీ నుండి సస్పెండ్ చేయటం చట్టవ్యతిరేకం అని స్పష్టం గా చెప్పింది. అయినా పాల్స్ ప్రెస్తేజ్ కోసం తీర్పును సబ్యులు అందరూ చదవి తమ నిర్ణయం చెప్పాక ,కోర్టు తీర్పు మీద సభ నిర్ణయం ప్రకటిస్తుందని చెప్పడం కరెక్టు కాదు. అసలు ఈ విషయం లో హై కోర్టు వారు ఎందుకు సభ నిర్ణయాన్ని చట్ట వ్యతిరేకం అన్నారో చూద్దాం .
Rule 340 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly (for short, the Rules). ప్రకారం ఎవరైనా సబ్యున్ని సస్పెండ్ చేయాలి అంటె కేవలం సంబందిత సెషన్ కాలానికి మించి చేయ రాదు. కాని ఆంద్ర ప్రదేశ్ అసెంబ్లీ నుండి సంవత్సర కాలం పాటు స్పీకర్ రోజా గారిని సస్పెండ్ చేసారు. కాబట్టి ఇది అల్ట్రా విరిస్ . అయితే ఆర్టికిల్ 212 ఏమి చెపుతుంద అంటె
212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature - (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.”
212 ప్రకారం సభకు సంబందించిన ప్రోసీడింగ్స్ ని ఇర్రెగులారిటి అనే కారణం మీద ఏ కోర్టులోనూ ప్రస్నించడానికి వీలు లేదు. ఇదే విషయాన్ని హై కోర్టు మందు ఆంద్ర ప్రదేశ్ అసెంబ్వ్లీ తరపున వాదించినప్పటికి అందుకు హై కోర్టువారు ఒప్పుకోలేదు. సంవత్సరం పాటు సస్పెషన్ చేయడం ఏదో మామూలు ఇర్రేగులర్ అంశం కాదు, పూర్తిగా చట్ట ఉల్లంఘన గానే బావించాల్సి ఉంటుంది కాబట్టి ప్రాదమికంగా సదరు తీర్మాణం ని చట్ట వ్యతిరేకమైనదిగా బావించి మద్యంతర రద్దు ఉత్తర్వులు జారీ చ్జేయడం జరుగుతుంది అని స్పష్టంగా చెప్పడం జరిగినది. అయినా రోజా గారిని కనుక ఆ ఉత్తర్వుల ప్రకారం సభలోకి అనుమతిస్తే ఇక ఆమెను నిలువరించడం ఎవరి తరం కాదు అనే భయం తోనే అధికార పార్టి వారు , ఆదరా బాదరా సింగిల్ బెంచ్ ఉత్తర్వుల మీద డివిజన్ బెంచ్ కి అప్పీల్ కి వెల్లారు. అది సోమవారం విచారణకు రానుంది అట.
అధికార పక్షానికి తాము చేసిన తప్పు ఏమిటో తెలిసినట్లే ఉంది. రోజా గారిని సభలోకి అనుమతించాల్సిన పరిస్తితి. కాని అది ఆమె తెచ్చిన కోర్టు ఉత్తర్వుల ద్వారా కాకుండా , తాము తీసుకునే సభా నిర్ణయం ద్వారానే జరిగిందని ప్రజలు అనుకునే లా చేసి తమ తొందరపాటు నిర్ణయం ద్వారా ఏర్పడిన ప్రతిష్ట బంగం అనే నష్టం నుండి బయట పడాలి అనుకుంటున్నారు కాబోలు.అందుకే సోమవారం ఏ నిర్ణయమూ చెపుతామని అంటున్నారు. ఈ లోపు డివిజన్ బెంచ్ వారు ఏమనేది తెలుస్తుంది కదా. ఏది ఏమైనా విషయాన్ని తెగే దాక లాగకుందా , ఆసెంబ్లీ పరిదిలోనే సమస్యను పరిష్కరిస్తే శాసన సభ్యల , చట్ట సభల గౌరవానికి బంగం కలుగకుండా ఉంటుంది. అలా కాకుండా తప్పు తెలిసి మూర్కంగా పోతే ఇది లెజిస్లేత్చర్ , జుడిషియరి మద్య వివాదం గా మారే ప్రమాదం కూడా ఉంది. ఆంద్ర ప్రదేశ్ శాసన సభ్యులు విజ్ఞత తో వ్యవహరించి రోజా గారిని ఏదో విదంగా సభ లోకి అనుమతిస్తారు అని ఆశిద్దాం
ఈ కేసులో హై కోర్టు వారు ఇచ్చిన మద్యంతర ఉత్తర్వ్లల పూర్తి సారాంశాన్నిక్రింద చూదవచ్చు.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
THURSDAY , THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND SIXTEEN
:PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A RAMALINGESWARA RAO
WPMP.NO:10932 of 2016
IN
WP.NO:8623 of 2016
Between:
Smt.R.K.Roja W/o R.K.Selvamani
...Petitioner(s)
(Petitioner in WP 8623 of 2016
on the file of High Court)
AND
1 The State of Andhra Pradesh , Rep. by its Principal Secretary Department of Legislative Affairs, Secretariat, Hyderabad
2 The Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Rep. by its
Secretary, Nampally,Hyderabad
Secretary, Nampally,
...Respondents
(Respondents in-do-)
Counsel for the Petitioner: SMT INDIRA JAISING SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI P SUBASH
Counsel for the Respondents: THE ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL (AP)
Petition under Section 151 of C.P.C. praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in W.P. the High Court may be pleased to direct the 2nd respondent to allow the petitioner to participate in the Assembly Session as announced by the respondents vide G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 22.02.2016, by suspending the decision of the 2nd respondent dated 18.12.2015, pending disposal of WP No. 8623 of 2016 on the file of the High Court.
The court while directing issue of notice to the Respondents herein to show cause as to why this application should not be complied with, made the following order.(The receipt of this order will be deemed to be the receipt of notice in the case). The Court made the following.
ORDER
Notice.
This Writ Petition is assigned to this Bench on the orders of the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to the direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in W.P (Civil). No.152 of 2016, dated 15.03.2016.
This Writ Petition is filed challenging the action of the second respondent in suspending the petitioner for a period of one year from the Assembly pursuant to the motion carried out on 18.12.2015 as ultra vires to Rule 340 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly (for short, the Rules).
This application is filed seeking a direction to the second respondent to allow the petitioner to participate in the Assembly session by suspending the decision of the second respondent dated 18.12.2015.
The undisputed facts are that the petitioner is a Member of the Fourteenth Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh
“We do not want to go into the legal question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the decision in the said case required to be applied in the fact situation to entertain the instant writ petition, particularly having regard to the fact that after withdrawal of the earlier Writ Petition No.4602/2016 questioning the very same suspension order by filing another writ petition as per the liberty given by the High Court, the Assistant Registrar of the High Court, instead of listing the said writ petition before the Roster Bench, has made endorsement, as stated supra, which is totally uncalled for on his part. Therefore, we direct the petitioner herein to refile the said writ petition before the High Court by tomorrow and the Registry of the High Court shall place the matter before the learned Chief Justice to take necessary instructions for listing the petition before the appropriate Bench as deemed fit by him so that the matter is listed tomorrow i.e., on 16.03.2016 for hearing the petitioner and respondents, if they appear, and consider the interim prayer and pass appropriate order on the same day in accordance with law.
The Registry of this Court is directed to communicate this Order by e-mail or telex with a direction to the Registrar of the High Court for placing the matter before the learned Chief Justice to take note of our observations.
Before concluding, we hold that the second petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable in law.”
Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice, who passed an order on 16.03.2016 assigning the case before this Court. Hence, this Court took up the matter yesterday on the orders of the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice even though this is not the regular Court and heard the learned Senior Counsel, Ms.Indira Jaising appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Advocate General, Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, for the respondents from 12.00 noon to 4.30 pm on 16.03.2016 and declared that the orders would be passed on the next day.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions:
i. The motion moved is ultra vires Rule 340 of the Rules.
ii. There was no ‘naming’ of the petitioner by the Hon’ble Speaker prior to the moving of the motion, which is a precondition under Rule 340(2) of the Rules, and hence, for violation of the said procedure, the motion is invalid in law.
iii. The petitioner was not given an opportunity to represent her case in the House and the principles of natural justice were violated while carrying out the motion of suspension.
iv. Even assuming without admitting that the motion was validly carried out, the suspension cannot go beyond the Sixth Session, which ended on 22.12.2015.
v. In view of the law authoritatively laid down in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha[1], this Court has got the power of judicial review and the same is reiterated in Alagaapuram R Mohanraj v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly[2].
Learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that the action was taken in exercise of substantive power conferred under Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India and the invocation of Rule 340 of the Rules in the motion was a mistake. He further submitted that Article 212 of the Constitution of India places a restriction on the power of this Court to examine a case of this nature and relied on certain observations made in the aboveRaja Ram Pal’s case (supra). He also submitted that the Madras High Court, in an unreported case in V.C.Chandhira Kumar v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly[3], upheld the power of the Legislature to suspend a Member beyond the period prescribed under the Rules as substantive power exists under Article 194 of the Constitution of India. He also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in P.Sudhirkumar v. The Speaker A.P.Legislative Assembly[4] and Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of Uttar Pradesh
A perusal of the draft proceedings of the Sixth Session dated 18.12.2015 submitted to this Court shows that, when the Leader of the House was making a statement, some ruckus by the petitioner and other Members belonging to her party, who came to the podium, took place, which resulted in moving the motion against the petitioner. The relevant portion of the proceedings of the House at the time of moving the motion is as follows:
“Mr.Speaker: Narendra garu, Rule position is clear and it is explained more than once. Therefore, on this issue not to discuss further. Please conclude in a word.
Sri Dhoolipalla Narendrakumar: Hon’ble Speaker, the reason why I am talking about the rules is ….
Mr. Speaker: Not necessary, that subject is over, please sit down.
Sri Dhoolipalla Narendrakumar: Mr.Speaker, why I am telling this rule position is because, how the member or a lady member should behave in the assembly. Smt.R.K.Roja, the lady member being in the house, has used derogatory words on the leader of the house, with unparliamentary words by a respectable person. Therefore, please take action on the lady member and suspend her from the assembly.
(Opposition party member Smt.R.K.Roja (without mike) had contended that it is unfair, illegal, as the mike is given to the ruling party members and not to the opposition party member while they are discussion on the women issues and the entire thing is being done at the behest of ruling party members)
Mr.Speaker: OK. Please be seated, Yes Minister for Legislative Affairs.
Sri Yanamala Ramakrishnudu: Hon’ble Speaker, lot of respected members has raised the same issue pertaining to the usage of unparliamentary words on the Hon’ble Chief Minister and had used the words unnecessary and all the this has been recorded and further it is being discussed in the public in a bad manner. This house is there for speaking good language and the same is being used for speaking vulgar language. The words used by Smt.R.K.Roja against the Chief Minister is Horrible as she has used the words “call Chandra Babu, Money Chandra Babu, Kama Chandra Babu”. He is the Chief Minister of the State. The Lady Member has used such kind of language and the same is derogatory to the house. This kind of member being in the house is shameful. (the ruling party members shouted shame, shame) Therefore, the house is requesting to suspend Smt.R.K.Roja for a period of one year. (Clapping of Ruling party members)
Mr.Speaker: The house is meant for purity and discipline and usage of this kind of words is unfortunate. This is spoiling the dignity of the assembly. Yes, Minister for Legislative Affairs.
Sri Yanamala Ramakrishnudu: (Minister for Legislative Affairs) Sir, with your permission, I beg to move:
“That under sub rule (2) of Rule 340 of the Rules of Procedure and conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the following Member named by the Hon’ble Speaker, be suspended from the service of the House for One year.
Smt.R.K.Roja
Mr.Speaker: Motion moved, Now, the Question is:
“That under sub rule (2) of Rule 340 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the following member named by the Hon’ble Speaker, be suspended from the Service of the House for One year.
Smt.R.K.Roja
(Pause)
The motion was adopted and the Member was suspended from the Service of the House for One year.
Mr.Speaker: Now, I request the suspended Member to leave the House. The suspended Member may please leave the House.”
In the light of the above proceedings, in order to examine the issue, Rule 340 of the Rules and provisions of the Constitution of India have to be examined.
Rule 340 of the Rules reads as follows:
“340. (1) The Speaker, if he deems it necessary name a member who disregards the authority of the Chair or abuses the rules of the House by persistently and willfully obstructing the business thereof.
(2) If a member is so named by the Speaker, the Speaker shall on a motion being made, forthwith put the question that the member (naming him) be suspended from the service of the House for a period not exceeding the remainder of the session:
Provided that the House may, at any time on a motion being made, resolve that such suspension be terminated.
(3) A member suspended under this rule shall forth-with withdraw from the precincts of the House.”
(emphasis supplied)
Articles 194, 208 and 212 of the Constitution of India read as follows:
“194. Powers, privileges, etc, of the House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State.
(2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution forty fourth Amendment Act, 1978.
(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of a House of the Legislature of a State or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of that Legislature.
208. Rules of procedure - (1) A House of the Legislature of a State may make rules for regulating subject to the provisions of this Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business.
(2) Until rules are made under clause (1), the rules of procedure and standing orders in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution with respect to the Legislature for the corresponding Province shall have effect in relation to the Legislature of the State subject to such modifications and adaptations as may be made therein by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, or the Chairman of the Legislative Council, as the case may be.
(3) In a State having a Legislative Council the Governor, after consultation with the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the Chairman of the legislative Council, may make rules as to the procedure with respect to communications between the two Houses.
212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature - (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.”
As stated above, it is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, for the purpose of this application, even if it is assumed that the motion was valid, it has to be ‘for the period not exceeding the remainder of the Session’. She substantiated her submission, while refuting the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General that the quoting of Rule 340 in the motion was a wrong one, by stating that the Hon’ble Minister for Legislative Affairs, who moved the motion, discharged the duties as a Speaker of the Legislative Assembly for nearly five years at one point of time and he cannot be said to be unaware of the application of the rule. The learned Additional Advocate General supported the motion submitting that the Rules are framed only in exercise of the enabling provision of Article 208 of the Constitution of India and no plea from the petitioner can be entertained in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of India on the ground of procedural irregularity. He further submitted that the petitioner used abusive language against other Members of the august House and that situation is not covered by Rule 340 of the Rules.
A perusal of Rule 340 of the Rules shows that it deals with two types of situations:
i) disregarding the authority of the Chair and
ii) abusing the rules of the House by persistently and willfully obstructing the business thereof.
In such a case, the Speaker has to ‘name’ the Member and after naming the Member by the Speaker, on a motion made, the Speaker shall suspend the Member from the service of the House ‘for a period not exceeding the remainder of the session’. This Rule was invoked by the Hon’ble Minister for Legislative Affairs while moving the motion and it cannot be said that he was moving the motion by quoting wrong provision of the Rules as contended by the learned Additional Advocate General. The Hon’ble Minister, who worked as a Speaker at one point of time, cannot be said to be unaware of the application of proper Rule in a situation like this. The context in which the motion was moved also justifies the invocation of the said Rule. But in this case, this Court is not concerned with the propriety of the motion but only with legality of the motion. The motion to suspend the Member of the House beyond the session while invoking Rule 340 of the Rules is, in my opinion, prima facie, a case of substantial illegality but not a mere irregularity coming within the purview of Article 212 of the Constitution of India. Hence, I am of the prima facie opinion that the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that the action of suspending the petitioner should not be traced to Rule 340 of the Rules, but should be traced to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, cannot be accepted at this stage.
Regarding the application of Article 212 of the Constitution of India, the position is no longer res integra, as the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal’s case (supra) summarized the position in paragraph 431 as follows:
“431. We may summarize the principles that can be culled out from the above discussion. They are:-
(a) Parliament is a co-ordinate organ and its views do deserve deference even while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny;
(b) Constitutional system of government abhors absolutism and it being the cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one, howsoever lofty, can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution, mere co-ordinate constitutional status, or even the status of an exalted constitutional functionaries, does not disentitle this Court from exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review of action which part-take the character of judicial or quasi-judicial decision;
(c) The expediency and necessity of exercise of power or privilege by the legislature are for the determination of the legislative authority and not for determination by the courts;
(d) The judicial review of the manner of exercise of power of contempt or privilege does not mean the said jurisdiction is being usurped by the judicature;
(e) Having regard to the importance of the functions discharged by the legislature under the Constitution and the majesty and grandeur of its task, there would always be an initial presumption that the powers, privileges etc. have been regularly and reasonably exercised, not violating the law or the Constitutional provisions, this presumption being a rebuttable one;
(f) The fact that Parliament is an august body of co-ordinate constitutional position does not mean that there can be no judicially manageable standards to review exercise of its power;
(g) While the area of powers, privileges and immunities of the legislature being exceptional and extraordinary its acts, particularly relating to exercise thereof, ought not to be tested on the traditional parameters of judicial review in the same manner as an ordinary administrative action would be tested, and the Court would confine itself to the acknowledged parameters of judicial review and within the judicially discoverable & manageable standards, there is no foundation to the plea that a legislative body cannot be attributed jurisdictional error;
(h) The Judicature is not prevented from scrutinizing the validity of the action of the legislature trespassing on the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens;
(i) The broad contention that the exercise of privileges by legislatures cannot be decided against the touchstone of fundamental rights or the constitutional provisions is not correct;
(j) If a citizen, whether a non-member or a member of the Legislature, complains that his fundamental rights under Article 20 or 21 had been contravened, it is the duty of this Court to examine the merits of the said contention, especially when the impugned action entails civil consequences;
(k) There is no basis to claim of bar of exclusive cognizance or absolute immunity to the Parliamentary proceedings in Article 105(3) of the Constitution;
(l) The manner of enforcement of privilege by the legislature can result in judicial scrutiny, though subject to the restrictions contained in the other Constitutional provisions, for example Article 122 or 212;
(m) Articles 122 (1) and Article 212 (1) displace the broad doctrine of exclusive cognizance of the legislature in England of exclusive cognizance of internal proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the case law that emanated from courts in that jurisdiction; inasmuch as the same has no application to the system of governance provided by Constitution of India;
(n) Article 122 (1) and Article 212 (1) prohibit the validity of any proceedings in legislature from being called in question in a court merely on the ground of irregularity of procedure;
(o) The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material or substitute its opinion for that of the legislature;
(p) Ordinarily, the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having acted for an extraneous purpose or being actuated by caprice or mala fide intention, and the court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse, giving allowance for the fact that the legislature is the best judge of such matters, but if in a given case, the allegations to such effect are made, the Court may examine the validity of the said contention, the onus on the person alleging being extremely heavy;
(q) The rules which the legislature has to make for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
(r) Mere availability of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, as made by the legislature in exercise of enabling powers under the Constitution, is never a guarantee that they have been duly followed;
(s) The proceedings which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny;
(t) Even if some of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action;
(u) An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the court to review the decision but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity;”
The learned Counsel on either side relied on some points in the above summary in support of their respective case. But both of them agreed with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court to review the action of the House of Legislature subject to Article 212 of the Constitution of India.
This Court is conscious of the ratio laid down in the above case and also the following observations made in the course of the judgment:
“24. The judicial organ of the State has been made the final arbiter of constitutional issues and its authority and jurisdiction in this respect is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Before coming to grips with the complex constitutional questions that have been raised, we would well remind ourselves, more than we do everyone else, of the following further observations made at SCR p.447: [U.P. Assembly case(Special Reference No.1 of 1964) (AIR 1965 SC 745) : (1965) 1 SCR 413 sub nom Keshav Singh, In re in p.763, para 43]
“In this connection it is necessary to remember that the status, dignity and importance of these two respective institutions, the legislatures and judicature, are derived primarily from the status, dignity and importance of the respective causes that are assigned to their charge by the Constitution. These two august bodies as well as the executive which is another important constituent of democratic State must function not in antinomy nor in a spirit of hostility, but rationally, harmoniously and in a spirit of understanding within their respective spheres, for such harmonious working of the three constituents of the democratic State alone will help the peaceful development, growth and stabilization of the democratic way of life in this country.”
The Rules are framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 208 of the Constitution of India and it cannot be said that Rule 340 of the Rules has to be ignored and the power under Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India should alone be invoked. In this case we are not concerned with the privileges of the members of the House and it came out during the course of arguments that separate proceedings are pending for violation of the privilege of the members.
Raja Rampal’s case was considered in Alagaapuram R Mohanraj’s case (supra) and it was held that, though there is a curtailment to the right of free speech in the Legislative Assembly, the order impugned in the said case did not violate the rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. However, in case of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, it was observed as follows:
“30. We now deal with the submissions of the petitioners that the impugned proceedings are violative of the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 14. According to the petitioners, the said proceedings have been taken in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is settled law that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to action taken against members by the legislative bodies is limited. However, it is likewise well settled that the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice is one of the limited grounds on which judicial review could be undertaken against the internal proceedings of the legislative bodies in appropriate cases.”
Though in Alagaapuram R Mohanraj’s case (supra), the order of suspension as well as the resolution passed pursuant to the report of the Privilege Committee were under challenge, there was no finding on the submission of the petitioners recorded in para 7 (i) of the decision to the effect that the House and the Speaker have no power to suspend the petitioners therein under Article 194 for a certain period of the next session.
But, in both the cases of Raja Ram Pal (supra) and Alagaapuram R Mohanraj (supra), the expulsion of the Members was considered and such expulsion took place after following some procedure. Here, the present case relates to the suspension of the Member by invoking Rule 340 of the Rules. The other decisions relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General are not applicable to the facts of this case and, prima facie, I am of the opinion that this Court can review the motion passed by the Legislative Assembly on the limited grounds available to it and subject to Article 212 of the Constitution of India.
Since this Court came to the prima facie conclusion that motion carried out was contrary to Rule 340 of the Rules of the House, this Court has to consider the balance of convenience in the instant case. The petitioner is an elected member of the Assembly and in the normal course she is entitled to participate in the proceedings, subject to Rules made by the House. If the suspension is continued during the pendency of the Writ Petition, the right of participation would be affected and cannot be restored in the event of her success in the Writ Petition. Hence, there shall be an interim suspension of the motion to suspend the petitioner carried out on 18.12.2015 by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.
The issues with regard to the application of principles of natural justice in a case like this, whether the House possesses the power to suspend a member dehors the Rule made by it etc., have to be considered in detail in the Writ Petition.
Post the Writ Petition for hearing after four weeks.
It is made clear that this order is not an endorsement of the conduct of the petitioner on 18.12.2015 in the House nor against the authority of the Hon’ble Speaker to take action against the erring member, but only a prima facie expression of the legality of the motion dated 18.12.2015. This order will not preclude the House from taking any appropriate action pursuant to the pending privilege proceedings.
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